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By PHILIPPE MARTIN AND H´EL`ENE REY*
We analyze the effects of financial and trade globalization on the likelihood of
financial crashes in emerging markets. While trade globalization always makes
crashes less likely, financial globalization may make them more likely, especially
when trade costs are high. Pessimistic expectations can be self-fulfilling and lead to
a collapse in demand for goods and assets. Such a crash comes with a current
account reversal and drops in income and investment. Lower-income countries are
more prone to such demand-based financial crises. A quantitative evaluation shows
our model is consistent with the main stylized facts of financial crashes in emerging
markets. (JEL F12, F32, F37, F41, O16)
Do emerging markets reap the benefits of
financial globalization, enjoying increased in-
vestment and a better ability to diversify risk?
Or do they face a higher likelihood of financial
crash as more capital flows in? The empirical
literature supports both possibilities. On the one
hand, a number of papers in finance show that
financial opening in emerging markets leads to
a decrease in the cost of equity capital and can
have a positive effect on domestic investment.1
On the other hand, a voluminous literature sur-
veyed by Joshua Aizenman (2004) emphasizes
the risks of liberalization and the vulnerability
of emerging market financial systems to capital
mobility. Charles Wyplosz (2001) finds that ex-
ternal financial liberalization is considerably
more destabilizing in developing countries than
in developed economies. Graciela Kaminski
and Sergio Schmukler (2001) show that stock
markets become more volatile in the three years
following financial liberalization but stabilize in
the longer run.
Interestingly, recent empirical work shows
that goods trade openness also influences the
frequency of crashes in emerging markets, but
in the opposite direction to financial openness.
Eduardo A. Cavallo and Jeffrey A. Frankel
(2004) find that trade openness (instrumented
by gravity variables) reduces the vulnerability
of countries to sudden stops. The Argentina of
the 1990s is often presented as a typical exam-
ple of a financially open economy relatively
closed to goods trade. It has suffered heavily
from sudden stops (see Guillermo A. Calvo et
al., 2003; Calvo and Ernesto Talvi, 2004).
These contradictory effects of financial and
trade globalizations are illustrated in Table 1.
We report the average number of financial
crashes per year for developed and emerging
economies, dividing each group along the di-
mensions of financial and trade openness.2
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1 See, for example, Geert Bekaert et al. (2005), Peter
Blair Henry (2000), and Anusha Chari and Henry (2002).
The macroeconomic literature finds more tenuous evidence
that financial opening contributes to long-term growth. See
Sebastian Edwards (2001), for example.
2 More precisely, emerging markets are defined as those
with GDP per capita equal or below that of South Korea.
The sample coverage for those countries starts at the earliest
in 1975 and ends in 2001. A crash is defined as a monthly
drop in the stock index (in dollars) larger than two standard
deviations of the average monthly change. We divided the
sample into periods for which countries were financially
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Table 1 suggests that opening to capital move-
ments is very positively correlated with the fre-
quency of crashes for emerging markets, but not
for industrialized countries. Trade openness
(whether measured by the trade-to-GDP ratio or
following Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner,
1995), however, is associated with a large de-
crease in the frequency of crashes for emerging
markets.3 Hence, according to Table 1, being an
emerging market open to financial flows while
closed to goods flows maximizes the frequency
of crashes.
The contribution of our paper is to present a
general framework in which these contradictory
effects of financial and trade liberalizations can
be reconciled. We can also make sense of the
differential impact of financial globalization on
emerging markets and developed economies.
We emphasize the key role of demand and
market size in driving both the positive effect of
financial integration on an emerging economy
and its negative consequences.
In our model, the world consists of one
emerging market and one developed economy
which differ only in their productivity level. In
both countries, entrepreneurs operating in mo-
nopolistic goods markets decide whether to fi-
nance risky fixed-sized investments, sell shares
of these investments on the stock exchange, and
acquire shares in other risky ventures developed
at home or abroad. Entrepreneurs may turn pes-
simistic and expect low levels of aggregate in-
vestment. Due to home bias in goods trade,
negative prospects regarding investment trans-
late into low expected income and demand for
goods, low profits, and hence low demand for
domestic assets. This validates their pessimistic
priors and deters them from developing risky
investments. The home bias in financial markets
in turn implies that the fall in income in the
emerging market also leads to a fall in domestic
asset demand and prices. In this equilibrium,
asset prices and investment collapse, income
decreases, and a capital flight occurs since do-
mestic agents buy shares in the developed coun-
try stock exchange. The circular causality is
magnified if trade costs are high, since firms’
profits and dividends in more closed economies
are more dependent on the level of local de-
mand. They are therefore more at risk when
expectations turn pessimistic.
The likelihood of a crash is higher at an
intermediate degree of financial segmentation.
When financial markets are perfectly integrated,
no financial home bias exists and arbitrage
equates asset prices, so that local income con-
ditions do not alter the cost of capital in the
open and financially closed, following Kaminsky and
Schmukler (2001). Hence, among our 62 countries (34
emerging countries), 31 appear twice as they changed status
during the sample years. We also classified countries in
terms of their openness to trade. We chose two widely used
measures of trade openness: (a) The classification by Sachs
and Warner (1995) extended to the 1990s by Romain Wac-
ziarg and Karen H. Welch (2003), who provide liberaliza-
tion dates for a broad set of countries. This measure of
openness is based on trade policies. Some countries have
liberalized financial and trade flows at different dates and
hence appear in different cells of the table. (b) The average
of exports plus imports over GDP during the period con-
sidered. This measure of openness captures the degree of
independence of the economy on local demand. We call
open (respectively closed) a country whose openness ratio is
above (respectively below) the median of its group. The
trade openness ratio cutoff for financially open emerging
countries is 63 percent of GDP. For the group of financially
closed countries, the trade openness ratio cutoff is 54 per-
cent. For more details, see the Data Appendix at http://
team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/martinp/table.pdf.
3 This is not the case for developed countries, for which
the frequency of crashes is low overall. For developed
economies, we use the ratio of trade to GDP as our measure
of openness. According to the Sachs-Warner measure, only
two industrialized countries are classified as closed at some
point, so we do not report the result.
TABLE 1—FREQUENCY OF CRASHES AND OPENNESS
Trade in goods
Emerging Developed
Closed Open Closed Open
Financially closed 0.40a 0.35b 0.09a 0.15b 0.07b 0.09a 0.10b
Financially open 0.78a 0.76b 0.55a 0.57b 0.05b 0.06a 0.14b
a Sachs-Warner measure of openness.
b Trade/GDP measure of openness.
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emerging market. Symmetrically, if financial
asset markets are very segmented internation-
ally, emerging market agents have no choice but
to invest at home. This rules out capital flight
and multiple equilibria, at the cost of ineffi-
ciency in capital markets.
In our setting, financial globalization in-
creases asset prices, investment, and income in
the emerging market, but only when interna-
tional trade costs are low. When emerging mar-
kets start opening their financial account but are
closed to trade in goods, they are more prone to
financial crashes. This comes chiefly from their
having a lower income than developed coun-
tries and from their dependence on local de-
mand due to market segmentation. The demand-
based mechanism also implies that our model
has the potential of generating quick recovery in
the aftermath of crises.
Our work is related to the literature on finan-
cial crises in emerging markets and sudden
stops. Calvo (1998) explores the role of credit
frictions to explain sudden stops. Enrique Men-
doza (2004) and Mendoza and Katherine A.
Smith (2002, 2004) show within an equilibrium
business cycle framework that small productiv-
ity shocks can trigger sudden stops in the pres-
ence of credit constraints when an economy is
highly leveraged.4 Philippe Aghion et al. (2004)
also use a model with credit frictions and find
that countries with intermediate levels of do-
mestic financial development and free capital
movements are more prone to macroeconomic
volatility. In contrast to these papers and most
of the existing literature, however, a financial
crisis in our model does not come from the
existence of credit constraints on capital mar-
kets and/or balance sheet effects.5 Neither is it
caused by moral hazard (as in Ronald I.
McKinnon and Huw Pill, 1999, and Giancarlo
Corsetti et al., 2001). Instead, in our setup, the
crisis is driven by a collapse in demand when
goods and financial markets are segmented by
trading costs and asset markets are incomplete.
Our theory is therefore complementary to the
existing literature on financial crisis.6 Our
model has multiple rational expectations equi-
libria, like in Chang and Velasco (2001), for
example, where internationally illiquid banks
may be subject to a run. But in our setup,
self-fulfilling expectations operate through
investment behavior and endogenously incom-
plete asset markets. Our framework has poten-
tially important policy implications: only once
emerging markets are well integrated in world
goods markets should they increase signifi-
cantly their degree of financial openness. We
make this point in a formal model, where any
degree of frictions on the goods and financial
markets and their interactions can be analyzed.
We present the model in Section I. Section II
describes the properties of the equilibrium in
“normal times,” while Section III investigates
the conditions necessary for a financial crash to
occur. Section IV performs a quantitative eval-
uation of our model. Finally, we draw some
conclusions in Section V.
I. Model
Ours is the only model known to us that
analyzes jointly home market effects in goods
and asset markets and their interactions. Firms
sell a monopolistic good in international mar-
kets where trade is costly. They also sell claims
on their expected (risky) profits on international
stock markets segmented by financial trading
costs. Our modeling strategy is simple enough
to handle both types of frictions in a tractable
way.
A. Technology and Trading Costs
There are two countries, E (emerging) and I
(industrialized), and two periods. All decisions
are taken in the first period. At the beginning of
the first period, L identical agents per country
are each endowed with one unit of labor and
one firm. There are two sectors: a perfectly
4 See also Mendoza (2002) and the survey of Cristina
Arellano and Mendoza (2003). For a view of Asian crises
based on implicit fiscal liabilities, see Craig Burnside et al.
(2001). Kiminori Matsuyama (2004) presents a model in
which borrowing constraints interact with financial global-
ization to produce an endogenous degree of inequality
across otherwise identical countries.
5 See Paul Krugman (1999), Ricardo J. Caballero and
Arvind Krishnamurthy (1998), Lawrence J. Christiano et al.
(2004), Martin Schneider and Aaron Tornell (2004), Rob-
erto Chang and Andres Velasco (2001), Bernhard Paasche
(2001), and Luis Felipe Cespedes et al. (2004).
6 We emphasize that the other channels studied in the
literature may be important, as well, to explain emerging
market crises. Our model is certainly compatible with all of
them.
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competitive constant returns-to-scale sector
with zero trade cost, which serves as the nu-
meraire, and a monopolistically competitive
sector with iceberg trade costs T. Transport
costs and trade policies both affect T. Each firm
corresponds to one variety, so that the total
number of varieties in the world is 2L. Both
sectors use labor as their only input. The only
difference between the two countries is labor pro-
ductivity, which we assume is equal in both sec-
tors and higher in the industrialized country than
in the emerging market. Free intersectoral labor
mobility, perfect competition, and free trade in the
constant returns to scale good imply that wage
rates wI (in the industrialized country) and wE (in
the emerging market) are equal to the marginal
productivity of labor. In the monopolistic good
sector, labor productivity is also given by wI and
wE, so that the marginal cost of production in
numeraire units is equal in both countries.
In the monopolistically competitive sector,
firms earn operating profits in the first period.
To create a diversification incentive at both the
national and international level, we introduce a
simple source of uncertainty. This will induce
agents to diversify in equilibrium their owner-
ship of firms.7 We assume that first-period prof-
its of monopolistic firms do not always
materialize in dividends to shareholders in the
second period. Without firm-specific invest-
ments, these profits vanish, due, for example, to
mismanagement at the firm level. When invest-
ment is performed by the firm, profits are dis-
tributed to shareholders with some positive
probability. The price of a share that is a claim
to risky profits is given by pE. The total cost of
investment is F  1⁄2 zE2Q, where zE is the num-
ber of investments undertaken by a firm in the
emerging market and Q is the price of the in-
vestment good.8 The marginal cost of undertak-
ing investments rises as the firm decides to do
more investments. In addition, a fixed cost F has
to be paid to start investing. We assume that this
fixed cost is paid individually by each investor
to all other agents in the economy so that ag-
gregate income is not affected by it.9 The value
of a firm is therefore the expected payoff of the
investment E  pEzE  1/2 zE2Q  F. The
investment good is produced with a Cobb-
Douglas production function with a share (1 
a) for labor and a for the composite good made
of all varieties of the monopolistic sector (see
below).
In the second period, there are N exogenous
and equally likely states of nature, and the re-
alization is revealed at the beginning of that
period after all decisions have been taken. As in
Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti (1997)
and Martin and Rey (2004), the technology im-
plies that each investment gives dividends (the
operating profits of the first period) in only one
state of nature. In all other states of nature, the
operating profits of the first period become zero.
The payoff structure is such that an investment
in country E yields dE if the corresponding state
of the world is realized, and zero otherwise.
Hence, investments in the two countries have ex
ante expected dividends, dE/N and dI/N. All
risky claims to operating profits are traded on
the stock market at the end of period one, so that
each claim corresponds to an Arrow-Debreu
asset. This gives agents in both countries a
strong incentive to diversify and buy shares of
both foreign and domestic investments. We as-
sume that the number of states of nature N is
large enough so that N  Zw where Zw 
L(zE  zI) is the total number of investments/
assets issued in the world. N  Zw is therefore
the endogenous degree of incompleteness of
financial markets. No duplication occurs in
equilibrium, so that each investment/asset in the
world is unique.10 This modelling introduces a
simple incentive for agents to diversify their
portfolios across firms in an otherwise standard
7 Foreign agents cannot operate production technologies
in the domestic country; hence, there is no FDI in our
model. They can, however, invest in claims to domestic
risky profits.
8 Industrialized country agents face a similar investment
cost function. We discuss in the working paper version
(Martin and Rey, 2002) how our results would be affected
by a more general convex cost function.
9 If the fixed cost has an impact on aggregate income, the
main results of the model are unaffected. However, the
results are analytically less tractable.
10 This is because as long as some states of nature have
not been covered, the price of an asset associated with these
states will always be higher than if the agent were to
replicate an existing investment/asset. This could obviously
lead to some exercise of monopolistic power in the asset
market, but we assume that investment developers do not
exploit it. The issue of “financial” monopolistic competition
in this type of framework is dealt with in Martin and Rey
(2004), who show that it creates another source of financial
home bias.
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monopolistic competition framework in the
goods market.
At the end of the first period, consumption takes
place and shares are sold on each of the stock
markets. These shares can be traded internation-
ally, but an agent in either country who wants to
buy assets in the other market must pay a financial
trading cost. This cost, essential for our results,
may capture government regulations on capital
flows, differences in regulations in accounting,
banking and commission fees, exchange rate
transaction fees, and information costs. The pres-
ence of these costs translates into a home bias in
asset transactions and holdings.11 We denote the
transaction costs on financial assets F and assume
that they take the form of an iceberg cost. This
implies that the transaction fee is paid in shares.
Agents have to buy (1  F)  1 units of shares
to receive one share.12 We interpret financial glob-
alization as a process through which these trans-
action costs are reduced.
B. Utility and Budget Constraints
We assume that the utility of an agent in each
country is given by the nonexpected utility func-
tion introduced by Larry G. Epstein and Stanley E.
Zin (1989) and Philippe Weil (1990). This allows
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which
we assume to be one for simplicity) to be different
from the coefficient of relative risk aversion 1/.
In the emerging market, the utility of a represen-
tative agent is given by:
(1) EUE lncEY1CE1 
  ln 
n1
N 1
N cE2 (n)
11/1/11/,
where cE2(n) denotes the second-period con-
sumption in one of the N states of the world and
E is the expectation sign. cEY is the consump-
tion of the CRS good with a share 1   in the
utility function while  is the share of the com-
posite good CE1 made of all varieties produced
in the world:
(2)
CE1   
i 1
L
cEi1
11/  
j 1
L
cEj1
11/ 1/1 1/.
  1 is the elasticity of substitution between
goods, while cEi1 and cEj1 are the consumptions
of domestic and imported varieties in period 1.
This composite good is used both for consump-
tion and investment in projects.
The first-period budget constraint of an agent
in E is
(3)
yE  cEY1  
i 1
L
vEi cEi1  
j 1
L
1  T vIjcEj1
 
k1
LzE
pEksEk  
l1
LzI
1 FpIlsEl
 wE E  T,
where yE is the emerging market per capita
income of the first period, vEi is the price of the
ith variety produced in the E market, vIj is the
price of the jth variety produced in the I market,
and E is the investment payoff. Asset prices
are denoted by pEk and pIl, and sEk and sEl are
demands for shares of risky investments devel-
oped in the emerging market and in the indus-
trialized country, respectively. T is the transfer
(in equilibrium equal to F). The budget con-
straint in the industrialized country is analo-
gous. In period 2, income and consumption
come only from dividends of shares purchased
in the first period. Hence, the budget constraint
for an agent in E is:
(4) cE2  dE sEk , if k 1, LzE;
dIsEl if l 1, LzI; 0 otherwise.
11 There is strong empirical evidence for home bias and
for the role of such costs in generating at least part of the
bias. See Richard Portes and Rey (2005) for the importance
of information costs, and Mendoza and Smith (2004) for
another model featuring trading costs on asset markets.
12 Iceberg transaction costs are borrowed from the trade
and geography literature. See Martin and Rey (2004) for a
more precise description. This modelling allows the elastic-
ity of substitution between assets to be the same for all
agents, and does not require the formal introduction of an
intermediation sector. Roger H. Gordon and Lans Boven-
berg (1996) use a similar type of proportional transaction
cost on capital flows, and focus on the cost of acquiring
information about foreign countries.
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We can therefore rewrite the utility of an agent
in the emerging market as
(5) EUE lncEY1CE1   ln
1
N1/11/
  ln 
k1
LzE
(dEsEk)11/
 
l1
LzI
(dIsEl)11/1/11/.
The utility and budget constraint of an
agent in the industrialized country are sym-
metric. In the second period, this utility func-
tion is similar to the one introduced by
Avinash K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz to
represent preferences for differentiated prod-
ucts. In fact,  can be interpreted as the elas-
ticity of substitution between assets. In what
follows, we impose   1 to have financial
home bias and realistic asset demands.13 This
restriction on  mirrors the standard assump-
tion in the differentiated products literature
that the elasticity of substitution between dif-
ferent varieties  is greater than one. This
restriction also implies that assets are substi-
tutes rather than complements, as in Acemo-
glu and Zilibotti (1997).14 Imposing  1 has the
additional benefit of ruling out any problem for
the states in which consumption is zero in the
second period due to market incompleteness.15
Agents in both countries choose consumption
(cEY, CE1 and cIY, CI1), and firms choose invest-
ment (the number of investments per firm are zE
and zI) at the beginning of the first period. They
form expectations about the number of invest-
ments in which other firms will engage, since
this will have an impact on the price of the
assets they will sell at the end of the first period.
As investments are ex ante symmetric, the de-
mands for each asset in a given country are
identical.16 We call sEE (sEI) the demand for
shares of a “typical” asset in the E (I) market by
an emerging market agent. Similarly, we denote
by cEE and cEI the first-period demand by an
emerging market agent for a good produced in E
and I, respectively. Because of symmetry,
within each country, all assets have the same
price, denoted by pE and pI, respectively. Since
marginal costs in units of the numeraire are
equal to one in both countries, and the elasticity
of substitution between varieties  is the same
for consumers and firms, all firms in the world
choose the same price for the monopolistically
competitive goods. That price, equal to the mar-
ginal cost multiplied by the markup, is given by
vE  vI  /(  1). For notational simplicity,
we drop the expectational sign in what follows.
C. Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined by a set of good
and asset prices [vE, vI, pE, pI], consumption and
investment allocations [CE1, CI1, cEY, cIY, zE, zI,
cE2(n), cI2(n)], and portfolio shares [sEE, sEI, sII,
sIE] such that:
(a) [CE1, cEY, sEE, sEI, cE2(n)] maximize UE
subject to E’s budget constraints (equations
(3) and (4)) taking prices as given.
(b) [CI1, cIY, sII, sIE, cI2(n)] maximize UI sub-ject to I’s budget constraints (the analogue
of equations (3) and (4)) taking prices as
given.
(c) [vE, vI, zE, zI] maximize profits and the
investment payoffs of firms taking prices
and investment decisions of other firms as
given. A firm invests if and only if its ex-
pected investment payoff i  pizi 
1⁄2 zi2Q  F is nonnegative for i  {E, I}.17
(d) Asset markets clear: LsEE  L(1  F)sIE 
1 and LsII  L(1  F)sEI  1.
(e) The world resource constraint is verified,
which implies: L[cEY  cIY  LcEE 13 See Section II. The demand for foreign assets de-
creases with transaction costs F for any . But using
iceberg trading costs (paid for in shares) implies that the
demand inclusive of transaction costs (which determines the
equilibrium on the stock market) would increase with F if
 were to be smaller than one.
14 In Section IV, we review the existing empirical esti-
mates for : they range from 1 to 12.
15 When we introduce a safe asset (see Section IV), this
issue of course does not arise any longer.
16 In each country, agents are different in the sense that
they hold different assets but they choose identical portfo-
lios and consumption patterns.
17 We focus on symmetric equilibria in which all or no
firms in a country invest. Equilibria in which only a portion
of firms invest are studied in the working paper version of
Martin and Rey (2002).
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LcEI(1  T)  LcII  LcIE(1  T)  12(zE2  zI2)Q(  a)/  dE  dI]  L(wE 
wI).18
(f) Expectations are rational.
II. When Things Go Well
We first solve the model in the optimistic
case, when firms of the emerging market expect
others to invest in a positive number of projects.
We define q  pE/pI as the relative asset price,
and d  dE/dI as the relative dividend. The
budget constraints and the first-order conditions
of an emerging market agent imply the optimal
consumption demands:
(6) cEY 
1 	 yE
1   ;
cEE 
 	 1yE
L1  1  
T 
;
cEI 
 	 1yE 1  T 
L 1  1  
T 
;
sEE 
yE
1  
1
LpE zE  
F zI q/d 1
;
sEI 
yE
1  
1  F q/d 1
LpI zE  
F zI q/d 1
,
where 0  
T  (1  T)1  1 is a measure
of trade openness and 
F  (1  F)1  1 is
a measure of financial openness. The demand
for foreign shares (sEI) decreases with financial
transaction costs.
At the optimum, the marginal cost of invest-
ing equals the marginal benefit: zEQ  pE.19
The demands for shares sEE and sEI increase
with income and decrease with the total number
of investments/assets. Analogous conditions
hold for the industrialized country. For all firms
in the economy to invest, the expected payoff
must be positive: pEzE  1⁄2 zE2Q  1⁄2 pE2/Q F.
We normalize the number of shares so that the
stock market equilibria in the two countries (in-
clusive of shares that are used to pay the transac-
tion costs) can be written for each asset as:
(7) 1  1pE

1    yEzE  zI
F(q/d) 1

yI
F(q/d)1 
zI  zE
F(q/d)1  ;
1 
1
pI

1    yIzI  zE
F(q/d)1 

yE
F(q/d) 1
zE  zI
F(q/d) 1 .
There are L(zE  zI) such equilibrium condi-
tions. In the parentheses, the first term repre-
sents the demand coming from domestic agents
and the second term foreigners’ demand (inclu-
sive of transaction costs). These equations im-
ply a financial home-market effect: local
income has a more important impact on the
local asset market than foreign income, as long
as 
F is less than one, i.e. as long as some
transaction costs exist.
The dividends of the second period are the
operational profits of the first period. Hence,
they are equal to sales (to consumers and firms)
divided by the elasticity of substitution:
(8)
dE 
yE  yI
T 
 1  1  
T 

1
2
azE
2  
T zI
2Q
 1  
T 
;
dI 
yI  yE
T 
 1  1  
T 

1
2
azI
2  
T zE
2Q
 1  
T 
.
These equations imply a trade home-market
effect: local income and investment have a more
important impact on sales and profits of local
firms than foreign income and investment, as
long as 
T is less than one, i.e., as long as trade
costs exist. Because our theoretical argument
requires only one source of trade home-market
effect, we assume from now on that a  0, so
that the investment good requires only labor,
Q  1, and profits come only from sales to
consumers. This allows us to derive all results
analytically. We come back to the more general
case with a  0 in the quantitative section.
18 We have used the cost minimization program of firms
to derive their demands for the investment good.
19 Q  aa(1  a)a1[/(  1)]a[L(1  
T)]a/(1)
is the price of the investment good.
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A. Equilibrium Relationship between Asset
Prices, Dividends, and Income Shares
As world income is fixed,20 it proves conve-
nient to define sY  yE/(yE  yI) as the share of
the emerging market in world income. From the
budget constraint and the optimal investment
rule, we get the first equilibrium relation be-
tween the relative income and the relative asset
price q, which we call the yy schedule:
(9) sY 
sw 2  
21   

21  1  q2 ,
where sw  wE/(wE  wI) 	 1⁄2 is the share of
the emerging market wage income in the world
wage income. The equilibrium yy relation im-
plies that an increase in the relative asset price
q generates an increase in relative income sY.
The reason is that emerging market investments
are sold at a higher price and more investments
are started.
Using the optimal investment rule, equation
(7) of the stock market equilibrium gives
(10) q  sY 1 	 
F
2  q
F q/d1   
F2

F q/d 1  q 	 sY q1 	 
F2
.
If 
F  1 (zero transaction costs on asset trade),
then q  d11/. This implies quite intuitively
that without any financial segmentation, the rel-
ative price of assets depends only on the relative
dividend and the elasticity of substitution but
not on local demand.
Using (8), we can derive the relative dividend
as
(11) d  sY 1 	 
T   
T1 	 sY 1 	 
T  .
If 
T  1 (zero transaction costs on goods
trade), then d  1. This implies, also quite
intuitively, that in the case of perfect goods,
market integration operating profits and there-
fore dividends do not depend on local incomes.
An increase in the relative income of the emerg-
ing market raises local demand more if there is
home bias in goods. In turn, the surge in local
demand increases relative operating profits and
dividends. Lower trade costs raise relative prof-
its and d as long as sY 	 1⁄2 .
Together, (10) and (11) provide a nonlinear
relation between the share of income in the
emerging market sY and the relative asset price
q. We call this positively sloped relation the qq
schedule. Two effects are at work: first, an
increase in income raises demand (mostly) for
locally produced goods due to home bias in
trade (
T 	 1), thereby increasing profits and
dividends (trade home-market effect). This, in
turn, increases the demand for assets and their
relative price. Second, an increase in income in
the emerging market leads to an increase in
saving which, as long as markets are segmented
(
F 	 1), falls disproportionately on domestic
assets (financial home-market effect). This also
increases the relative price of emerging market
assets.
B. Globalization and Asset Prices
In this section, we show that trade and finan-
cial liberalizations may have very different ef-
fects on asset prices and income. Whereas
increasing trade openness is always positive,
opening the capital account has an ambiguous
effect.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the equilibrium as
the intersection of the yy and qq schedules. The
relative price of assets q is less than one as long
as the financial or goods markets are not per-
fectly integrated (
F 
 1 or 
T 
 1) and sw 	
1⁄2 . The difference in asset price is higher, the
larger the differential in productivity. The two
curves cross only once, so that only one “good”
equilibrium exists. Trade integration (an in-
crease in 
T) is easily analyzed. As long as sw 	
1⁄2 , the fall in trade costs implies a rightward
shift of the qq curve (sY/
T 	 0 for a given q
along the qq curve). The yy curve, meanwhile,
is unaffected. The effect, shown in panel A of
Figure 1, is an increase of the emerging market
relative asset price and income share, for any
level of financial integration.
Intuitively, lower trade costs increase profits
and dividends of firms in the emerging market:
from (11), d/
T  0 as long as sY 	 1⁄2 . This
in turn increases the demand for emerging mar-
ket assets and their relative price, which gener-
ates a rise in relative income. Due to the
20 From the stock market equilibria we obtain that
pEzE  pIzI  (yE  yI)/(1  ). Using the optimal
investment rule and the definition of world income, we
therefore have L(yE  yI)  2L(1  )(wE  wI)/(2  ).
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convexity of the investment cost function, the
total number of assets is increasing in q. Hence
trade integration also alleviates financial market
incompleteness, as measured by N  Zw, and
therefore reduces the volatility of consumption
in the second period.
In contrast, a fall in financial transaction costs
has an ambiguous effect on asset prices, relative
income, and market incompleteness. In Appen-
dix A we give the exact condition for which an
increase in 
F (increase in financial openness)
leads to a rise in q. A sufficient condition is that
the relative return of the emerging market asset
d/q is more than one. Interestingly, this will be
the case for low enough trade costs. The condi-
tion is verified, for example, in the extreme case
of perfect goods market integration, as d  1
and q 	 1 (whenever financial integration is not
perfect). Intuitively, in that case, financial open-
ing enables agents in the industrialized country
to buy the cheaper emerging market assets. For
high trade costs, however, the profits of emerg-
ing market firms are lower than in the industri-
alized country, making emerging market assets
relatively unattractive. The relation between asset
prices and financial liberalization is U-shaped,
so that financial opening may actually lead to a
decrease in the demand for emerging market
assets (capital outflows), a decrease of their
price, and more market incompleteness. Finan-
cial liberalization with low trade costs has
the same positive effects on asset prices and
income as trade integration. It can also, there-
fore, be illustrated by panel A in Figure 1. In
contrast, when trade costs are high, financial
liberalization leads to lower asset prices and
income in the emerging market, as illustrated in
panel B.
C. Globalization and the Current Account
We now study the impact of globalization on
the first-period current account of the emerging
market. The current account is the difference
between the country’s production and the mar-
ket value of investment and consumption:
(12) CAE  LyE 	 zE2 	 yE1  
 L

1  wE 	 wIq
2
1 q2 .
The current account deteriorates as the relative
asset price in the emerging market increases.
Hence, trade integration (an increase in 
T)
always implies an increase in the current ac-
count deficit. Financial integration (an increase
in 
F) also leads to a current account deficit if
trade costs are not too high. In that case (see
previous section), liberalizing capital move-
ments generates net capital inflows in the
emerging market as agents in the industrialized
economy take advantage of the lower asset
prices in the emerging market. If trade and
financial transaction costs are sufficiently low,
A
B
FIGURE 1. LIBERALIZATION IN THE EMERGING MARKET
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the emerging market current account is in deficit
in normal times.
III. Self-Fulfilling Expectations and Financial
Integration: When Things Go Wrong
Until now, we focused on the equilibrium in
which there is positive investment in both coun-
tries. The decision to invest depends, however,
on the expected price of assets at the end of the
period, and therefore on the strategies of all
other firms. We now investigate under what
conditions a crash driven by self-fulfilling ex-
pectations can occur. We define a crash as an
equilibrium in which no single firm has an in-
centive to invest, given that no other firm is
investing. The condition for this to happen is
E(Ec)  E(pEczEc  1⁄2 zEc2  F)  0, where
the index c denotes the crash equilibrium. In
that case, the expected asset price is low enough
that no firm deviates from the zero-investment
equilibrium.21
Expected aggregate income in the emerging
market in a crash is E(LyEc)  LwE, since
expected financial wealth is zero. This affects
the expected relative demands for assets in the
emerging and industrialized economies. Using
the stock market equilibrium (7), we show that
the expected relative asset price in crash is
(13) qc
 sw(2)
F1 	
F 2(1)
F2(1) 
1/
dc11/,
where we drop the expectation operator from
now on. The relative price decreases with finan-
cial globalization at low levels of 
F and then
increases with globalization for higher levels of

F. The relative dividend is given by
(14)
dc 
sw 2  1 	 
T   21  
T
21   	 sw 1 	 
T 2  
.
In a crash, the emerging market relative div-
idend increases with lower trade costs on goods
markets and with labor productivity in the
emerging market.
A crash occurs if the expected payoff of
investing is negative:
(15) Ec 

2   wE  wI qc
2 	 F  0.
The investment payoff is U-shaped as a function
of 
F. Inequality (15) can therefore be satisfied
for intermediate levels of financial transaction
costs.
Multiple equilibria exist if and only if qc2 	
q2/(1  q2). This guarantees that, for a given set
of parameter values, a “good” equilibrium ex-
ists whenever zE  0 and a crash equilibrium
exists whenever zEc  0.22, 23 For this condition
to be verified, the fall in price during a crash
must be large enough. Using (13), it can be
checked that the crash equilibrium cannot occur
in the absence of capital flows (
F  0), as qc
goes to infinity because agents can save only by
buying domestic assets.24 This puts a floor on
the demand for domestic assets and on their
expected price since capital flight is impossible.
At the other end, in a situation without frictions
(
F  
T  1), qc  1, so arbitrage implies that
agents in the industrialized country would rush
to buy assets in the emerging market in the
event of a crash. This rules out the possibility of
a crash in the emerging market altogether.
Hence, a crash is possible only for intermediate
levels of the financial frictions and for high
enough levels of trade costs.
Circular causation is at work. If firms believe
that other firms will undertake no investment,
then they expect aggregate income in the
emerging market at the end of the period to be
low. Lower expected income entails lower sav-
ings and a lower demand for assets. When fi-
21 zEc in this condition is the investment that would be
made by a single “pessimistic” firm if it anticipates that no
other firm will invest. The optimal investment rule zEc 
E(pEc) still applies. This firm is small (L is large) so that its
decision does not affect aggregate income or investment.
22 As mentioned before, we are limiting our analysis to
symmetric equilibria in which all investors in each country
behave similarly.
23 In the absence of an equilibrium selection device, our
model has nothing to say about the transition between
equilibria. We also cannot perform meaningful welfare
comparisons. These drawbacks are common to all multiple
equilibrium models.
24 This also implies that an equilibrium where both coun-
tries are in crash is not possible.
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nancial markets are segmented and assets are
imperfect substitutes, this fall in demand for
assets affects local assets disproportionately.
This in turn generates a low relative asset price
in the emerging market (financial home bias
effect). Trade costs magnify this effect since a
crash that lowers income in the emerging mar-
ket also lowers demand for goods. This falls
more than proportionately on goods produced in
the emerging market, so that expected operating
profits in the emerging market also fall. This
home bias in trade in goods also contributes to
the fall in dividends and asset prices.
Is the emerging market more vulnerable to a
financial crash than the industrialized economy?
We can compare the payoff level of a single
“pessimistic” investor in the emerging market
(zEc  0) given in equation (15) to its analogue
in the industrialized country (zIc  0). We find
that Ic  Ec as long as 
T or 
F 	 1. The
“pessimist” payoff function of the industrialized
country is always above the emerging market
one. Due to the dual home bias (in trade and
finance), the demand for assets in the rich mar-
ket, even when depressed by pessimistic expec-
tations, is always higher than in the emerging
market. This implies a higher price for assets
even when bad times are expected: the indus-
trialized country can never be as pessimistic
about its own demand—and therefore its asset
prices—as the emerging market. Hence, if the
productivity differential is sufficiently high, the
industrialized country can never experience a
crash. The negative relation between income
per capita and the vulnerability to crashes ap-
pears only when countries are sufficiently open
to capital movements, a fact that accords well
with Table 1.
The analysis of asset prices in a crash also
shows that countries more open to trade in
goods (larger 
T) are less vulnerable to financial
crashes. Indeed, these countries’ operating prof-
its and dividends (equation (14)) are less depen-
dent on local income and therefore less affected
by the crash. Hence, the crash itself is less
likely. This implies that the set of parameters
for which a crash occurs is smaller for countries
more open to trade. We therefore find a funda-
mental asymmetry in the effect of trade and
financial openness on the vulnerability of coun-
tries to financial crashes. Whereas trade open-
ness unambiguously decreases this vulnerability,
financial openness may increase it.
Figure 2 depicts payoff functions in crash as
a function of financial openness 
F. Crashes can
occur in the area below the zero line, whose
exact position depends on the level of F. For a
given level of trade openness, countries with
higher levels of productivity (higher wages) are
less vulnerable to crashes. For a given level of
productivity, countries that are more open to
trade in goods are less vulnerable to crashes.
A financial crash in the emerging market is
characterized by low asset prices, investment,
income, and consumption (both in first and in
second periods). The total number of assets at
the world level decreases since it is an increas-
ing function of q. Hence, both market incom-
pleteness and the volatility of second-period
consumption are higher. It can be shown that
per capita income in the emerging market is
lower in a financial crash (wE) than in autarky.
Contrary to what occurs in the “good” equi-
librium, the emerging market experiences a cur-
rent account surplus given by LwE/(1  ). In a
crash, agents can only buy foreign assets from
the industrialized country to save and diversify
risk, so that capital flight occurs.
IV. Quantitative Analysis
This section assesses the potential of our de-
mand-based theory of financial crisis to match
key stylized facts of emerging market crashes,
such as a drop in asset prices, income collapse,
and current account reversal. Table 2 (taken
from Mendoza and Smith, 2004) reproduces
data for four emerging markets, Argentina, Ko-
rea, Mexico, and Russia. Table 3 presents the
parameter values used in the calibrations. Panel
A of Table 4 provides the quantitative implica-
tions of the exact model we described in the
FIGURE 2. CRASH AND TRANSACTION COSTS
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previous sections. We call it the “stylized
model.” And, indeed, since our model is quite
stylized, we augment it by adding two realistic
features to get our “baseline model” (panel B of
Table 4): (a) Agents have access to a safe low
return technology that gives a payoff in a frac-
tion  of the states of nature covered in normal
times, i.e., without a crash. We experiment with
different degrees of international tradability of
this technology. We interpret our safe technol-
ogy as any alternative way used by agents to
save their income during financial crises, such
as purchases of durable goods or cash hoard-
ings. (b) We allow for limited participation in
the stock market. Neither of these two new
features alters significantly the qualitative prop-
erties of our model, nor do they change the
fundamental mechanisms presented in the pre-
vious sections. But they notably improve the
quantitative properties of our model. Appendix
B provides the key equations of this augmented
model.25
A. Calibration
The most important parameters of our model
are the trade costs T, financial costs F, ratio of
wages wE/wI, elasticities of substitution for goods
 and assets , and the share of households
participating in the stock market which we de-
note as . The interaction of trade costs and
25 They are not analytically solvable, unlike their coun-
terparts of Sections II and III, but carry the same effects and
intuitions. This is why we chose to discuss the more stylized
model in the core of the paper and present this more general
version in the quantitative section. The programme used to
solve the model is available from the authors.
TABLE 2—CRISES IN FOUR EMERGING ECONOMIES
Real equity prices
(percent change)
Current account/GDP
(percent points change)
Ind. production
(percent change)
Argentina (94.4–95.1) 27.82 4.05 9.26
Korea (97.4–98.1) 9.79 10.97 7.20
Mexico (94.4–95.1) 28.72 5.24 9.52
Russia (98.3–98.4) 59.37 9.46 5.20
Notes: Real equity prices are deflated by the CPI, except Russian equity prices which are in
U.S. dollar terms. The change in the current account to GDP ratio for Argentina corresponds
to the second quarter of 1995. Industrial production for Korea and Russia are annual rates
(Mendoza and Smith, 2004).
TABLE 3A—PARAMETERS
Wages
wE/wI
Subst.
goods

Subst.
assets

Discount

Risk
premium
Safe

Manuf.
share
, a
Base case 1/5 5 5 0.99 1.05 1 0.4
High 1/3 10 8 — 1.10 — 0.6
Low 1/8 4 3 0.95 1.02 0.1 0.3
TABLE 3B—FRICTIONS
Financial cost
F percent
Trade cost
T percent
Participation
 percent
No crisis Base case 5 40 36
High 10 80 50
Low 1 20 10
Crisis Base case 6 50 36
High 12 10 50
Low 1.2 25 10
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financial costs is key to getting plausible quan-
titative results. A period is a quarter. The values
of the parameters we use are discussed below
and summarized in Table 3.
Trade Costs.—We base our estimates of
trade costs T mainly on James E. Anderson and
Eric van Wincoop (2004). According to these
authors, “the pure international component of
trade barriers, including transport costs and bor-
der barriers but not local distribution margins, is
estimated to be in the range of 40–80 percent
for industrialized countries.” The estimate is
based on both direct evidence and indirect evi-
dence stemming from the gravity literature.
This estimate roughly breaks down as a 21-
percent transportation cost, an 8-percent policy
barrier, a 7-percent language barrier, a 14-per-
cent currency barrier, a 6-percent information
cost barrier, and a 3-percent security barrier. We
pick 20 percent as the low estimate of our
trading costs on the goods market; this roughly
corresponds to the pure transport cost estimate
of Anderson and van Wincoop. We choose 80
percent as our upper estimate and 40 percent as
our base case.
Crises are accompanied by the collapse of
trade credits, increased exchange rate uncer-
tainty, information asymmetries and higher in-
surance costs. All these elements are exogenous
to our model. Unfortunately we do not have any
reliable estimates of the increase in trade costs
in crisis time to calibrate our model precisely.26
We assume in our stylized model of Table 4
(panel A, lines 1–3, 5) that trade costs are in-
variant between normal and crisis times. Then,
in the baseline model of Table 4, panel B, and in
panel A, line 4, we assume that trade
26 Zihui Ma and Leonard Cheng (2005) document the
disruption of trade during a financial crisis. Using a gravity
equation framework, they find a significant decline in trade
flows, even after controlling for economic fundamentals.
Their analysis does not allow a precise quantification of the
effect, however. In the narrower case of sovereign defaults,
Andrew K. Rose (2005) and Jose´ V. Martinez and Guido
Sandleris (2004) also document a decrease in trade flows,
even after controlling for fundamentals.
TABLE 4—QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Panel A
q
Asset price
percent
change
CAE/yE
Current account
percent point
change
yE
Income
percent
change
1 Stylized model 22.8 46.2 30.7
2 With safe technology 22.4 36.5 30.7
3 With limited participation 12.1 19.7 13.1
4 With trade disruption 29.5 46.2 30.7
5 With financial disruption 23.2 46.2 30.7
Panel B
6 Baseline model 20.5 15.4 13.1
7 Tradable safe asset 20.1 8.8 13.1
8 High F 20.8 13.9 12.7
9 Low F 20.2 16.8 13.5
10 High T 18.9 8.1 6.9
11 Low T no crash
12 High T (on imports) 22.2 17.1 14.4
13 Low T (on exports) no crash
14 Low wE/wI 21.1 20.3 15.8
15 High wE/wI 20.0 11.7 11.5
16 High  20.9 13.0 11.8
17 Low  18.3 19.1 15.6
18 High  17.1 5.9 5.0
19 Low  18.5 19.0 16.3
20 High , a 20.5 15.4 13.1
21 Low , a 20.6 15.5 13.1
22 High participation 23.1 20.8 17.5
23 Low participation 14.1 4.6 3.9
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costs, both on imports and exports, increase in
crisis time by 25 percent from their base value
T in normal times. We call this the trade dis-
ruption case.
Financial Costs and Limited Participation.—
The choice of an estimate for financial transaction
costs is more difficult, as there is no consensus in
the literature. Financial costs should include the
cost of government regulations on capital flows,
the cost of differences in regulations in account-
ing, banking and commission fees, foreign ex-
change transaction fees, and, most importantly,
information costs between emerging markets and
industrialized countries. Reviewing the literature,
John Heaton and Deborah J. Lucas (1996, p. 467)
argue that for the U.S. equity market, “transaction
costs as high as 5 percent are reasonable.” Given
the lack of precise data for emerging markets, we
choose again a wide interval of transaction costs
ranging from 1 percent to 10 percent, with a base
case set at 5 percent.
During crises, however, volatility on the for-
eign exchange market increases, and there is
more information asymmetry and adverse selec-
tion. International financial transaction costs are
therefore also likely to increase.27 We take this
possibility into account and call it the financial
disruption case. In that scenario, financial costs
go from our baseline case of 5 percent in normal
times to 6 percent. We also allow for the case of
joint financial and trade disruption, where both
financial and trade costs increase during a crash.
Data on limited stock market participation
are not available for emerging markets. For the
United States, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
documents household participation rates in the
stock market of 36 percent in 1994. We pick
this number as our baseline case.
Elasticities, Relative Wages, and Manufac-
turing Shares.—We pick an elasticity of substi-
tution for goods of 5 in the base case, in the
middle of the range of the estimates of the trade
literature. We experiment with values of 4 and 10,
thereby covering the estimates surveyed in Ander-
son and van Wincoop. We calibrate the elasticity
of substitution between assets using Jeffrey A.
Wurgler and Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya (2002).
They report the results of several studies, as well
as their own estimates, for U.S. stocks. The elas-
ticity ranges from 1 (Andrei Shleifer, 1986) to
their own: 6, 8, and 12 depending whether stocks
have close substitutes or not. Given that the im-
portant elasticity in our context is the one between
equities of the emerging market and equities of the
industrialized country, which are less substitutes
than domestic ones, we choose a rather low elas-
ticity for the base case, i.e., 5. We also experiment
with 8 and 3.
We calibrate the wage ratio wE/wI between
the emerging market and the industrialized
country at 1/5. The Bureau of Statistics of the
U.S. Department of Labor (2002) reports hourly
compensation costs for production workers in
manufacturing for a selected group of countries.
For Mexico and Brazil, these were 12 percent of
those of the United States. For Korea, these
amounted to 42 percent and for Asian newly
industrialized economies, 34 percent. We ex-
periment with 1/8 in the low case and 1/3 in the
high case.
We choose  and a, the share of the manu-
factured good in the utility function and in the
production function of the investment good, to
be equal to 0.4. This number is usually the one
picked in the trade literature for the share of the
manufacturing sector. We also experiment with
higher (0.6) and lower (0.3) values.28
Safe Technology.—We set  to 1 in the base
case, implying that agents are able to use the
safe technology to save during the crash for all
states of nature covered in a noncrash equilib-
rium. We also experiment with low levels of 
(0.1), implying that the “safe asset” gives a
dividend in 10 percent of the states of the world
covered in normal times. We also vary the
27 For example, for the forex market alone, the 1998
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Capital
Markets report mentions that: “Prior to the crisis, bid-ask
spreads on these (Asian) currencies had been similar, per-
haps modestly higher, than those for the major currencies.
Following the crisis, these spreads widened by factors of
between 6 (ringgit) and 13 (rupiah), implying, for example,
a hefty 1.7-percent average cost of carrying out a rupiah-
dollar transaction on the spot market since the crisis, rising
on occasion to as much as 10 percent. Higher volatility and
transaction costs were also associated with a drying up of
liquidity.”
28 The other constraint is that the nonmanufacturing sec-
tor should always exist in both countries. This requires that
 and a not be too large.
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degree of tradability of the safe asset, from
nontraded to a transaction cost as for the other
assets. We set the discount rate  to 0.99 in the
base case. We calibrate the safe technology
parameters in order to match the risk premium
at 5 percent (annualized). The latter is defined
as the expected difference in return between a
risky asset in the emerging market and the safe
technology. The return of the safe technology is
low enough that agents who have access to
financial markets have no incentive to use it in
absence of a crash.
B. Results
We are interested in the change in three vari-
ables summarizing the state of the economy:
equity prices in dollars, the current account rel-
ative to income, and income.29
We start with a calibration of the exact styl-
ized model described in Sections I to III. There
is no safe technology and no limited participa-
tion. All parameters are set to their base value of
Table 3A. Furthermore, trading costs and finan-
cial costs are equal in normal and crisis times.
The only difference is that the investment sector
uses manufactured goods so that a is not equal
to zero. Results are displayed in Table 4 (line 1).
The stylized model has qualitatively correct
predictions. High enough trade costs insure that
the emerging market asset dividends are depen-
dent on local conditions, which in turn makes
possible self-fulfilling demand collapses. Con-
versely, when trade costs are reduced to 20
percent, for example, the possibility of a crash is
eliminated. Also, multiple equilibria do not ex-
ist whenever financial costs are higher than 60
percent. These results confirm the interactions
between trade and financial costs we put for-
ward in the theoretical section.
Quantitatively, the model is able to generate
large drops in asset prices (22.8 percent) but
produces far too large a drop in income (30.7
percent). The reason is that, in the crash, the
entire financial wealth of the emerging market is
wiped out. Since all our agents participate in the
stock market, this generates a dramatic drop in
aggregate income. The stylized model generates
capital inflows into the emerging market in tran-
quil times and outflows in crisis times. But it
produces too large current account reversals
(from 11.7 percent of GDP in normal times to
34.5 percent in crisis times). This comes, in
particular, from the absence of a safe technol-
ogy: during the crisis, emerging market agents
can save only by purchasing foreign risky as-
sets, implying large capital outflows. In lines 2
to 5 of Table 4, we alter the stylized model by
adding each time only one of the following
features: safe technology; limited participation;
increase in trade costs during the crisis (trade
disruption); increase in financial costs during
the crisis (financial disruption).
If we add the safe technology (line 2), we do
not change much the drop in asset price nor the
collapse in output; but the swing in the current
account is lower, which helps bring the model
somewhat closer to the data.30 Adding limited
participation to the stylized model (only 36 per-
cent of households participate in the stock mar-
ket) decreases the effect of financial wealth on
the economy (line 3). The drop in asset price is
smaller because, in this case, 64 percent of the
economy is effectively insulated from the crash.
In contrast, if we introduce trade disruption
(line 4), we are able to match the data as far as
the drop in asset price is concerned (29.5
percent) but the drop in output and the current
account reversal are still too extreme. This dra-
matic effect on the asset price comes from the
decrease in profits of the emerging market
firms, which have to rely even more on domes-
tic demand in crisis times. The ensuing decrease
in dividends is magnified by the income effect
and creates a sharp drop in the emerging market
asset price. The same type of mechanism, i.e.,
an increased reliance on domestic demand to
sell assets in crisis times, explains the effect of
financial disruption on asset prices (line 5), but
quantitatively the effect is much smaller.
29 Quarterly data on GDP are not available for these
countries. Industrial production is therefore used as a proxy
for income. In our model, income and consumption are
perfectly correlated due to the log utility, so we do not
report changes in consumption.
30 Adding a safe technology makes possible the exis-
tence of crashes in autarky, since it may not be worthwhile
for agents to invest in risky assets if everyone else coordi-
nates on the safe technology. This does not, however, alter
the logic behind the existence of multiple equilibria for
intermediate levels of financial costs. Emerging market
agents now invest both in foreign risky assets and in the safe
asset during crashes. In this experiment, the safe technology
is nontraded.
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Our baseline model incorporates all these fea-
tures. Panel B of Table 4 (line 6) presents the
model when the safe technology, limited partic-
ipation, trade, and financial disruption are all
present at the same time. All the parameters
have been set to their base value of Table
3A and 3B. As before, the only difference be-
tween the emerging market and the developed
economy is their productivity level. This base-
line model is closer to the data. Asset prices
drop by 20.5 percent, income drops by 13.1
percent, and the current account goes from4.1
percent in normal times to 11.3 percent in
crisis times, i.e., a reversal of 15.4 points of
income. We have checked that the industrial-
ized country cannot be subject to a crash with
these parameters.
We now subject the baseline model to sensi-
tivity experiments. If the safe technology is
internationally tradable, the current account re-
versal becomes smaller. For example, if 30 per-
cent of the safe projects are internationally
tradable (with the same transaction costs as
other assets), then (see line 7) the current ac-
count reversal is only 8.8 points of GDP be-
cause the emerging market sells these assets to
the industrialized country. The drops in asset
price and income remain similar because the
international tradability of the safe asset leads
the industrialized country to buy less of both
risky assets in a crash so that their relative price
does not change much.
In lines 8 to 13, we perform some sensitivity
analysis of the magnitude of the frictions. Varying
financial costs (high and low cases in Table 3B)
affect the magnitude of the current account rever-
sal. If  	 1 (the safe asset gives in less than 100
percent of states of nature covered in a noncrash
equilibrium), then increasing financial costs suffi-
ciently eliminate the possibility of a crash. Chang-
ing trade costs alter both the domain of existence
of multiple equilibria and the magnitude of the
crash. Because (symmetrically) higher trade costs
in the goods market generate lower asset prices
and income in both the no-crash and the crash
equilibria, they may lead to a smaller crash (line
10). Lower trade costs, however, always make the
domain of multiple equilibria smaller: with trade
costs at 20 percent, a crash is not possible (line
11). But we can also investigate the impact of
asymmetric trade costs. For high import costs (due
to higher tariffs or less efficient port facilities, for
example), the crash is more pronounced (22.2
percent, line 12) because the asset price in E is
higher in the no-crash equilibrium. Protectionism
increases profits of firms in the good equilibrium
when domestic income is large. It does not, how-
ever, sever the link between asset prices and pes-
simistic expectations affecting domestic demand.
Hence, protectionism does not decrease the
likelihood of a financial crash. On the other
hand, lower export costs make sales of E
firms more dependent on world income,
which is more stable than domestic income
and therefore weakens the circular causality
mechanism at the origin of a crash. When
export costs are down to 20 percent, the pos-
sibility of a crash is eliminated (line 13).
A higher productivity differential between the
rich country and the emerging market exacerbates
all the characteristics of the crash since our mech-
anisms are based on demand: a relatively poorer
emerging market will experience, ceteris paribus,
a sharper drop in asset prices and income and a
larger current account reversal (lines 14 and 15). If
the difference in wage between the emerging mar-
ket and the industrialized country is small enough,
the possibility of a crash disappears. This is the
case if wE is only 50 percent smaller than wI. This
confirms that our mechanism is able to explain
why emerging markets are more prone to crashes
than high-income countries.
A high elasticity of substitution across as-
sets tends to increase the extent of the crash
(lines 16 and 17). Since the transformations
of the financial costs 
F  (1  F)1 and
of the trade costs 
T  (1  T)1 are the
effective measures of financial and trade
openness in the model, an increase in  is like
an increase in F. An increase in  is analo-
gous to a increase in T, but it also decreases
profits in the monopolistic sector and there-
fore the role of demand on dividends. Hence,
the effect of  on the magnitude of the crash
is ambiguous (lines 18 and 19).
In lines 20 and 21, we check that the manu-
facturing sector share does not change the re-
sults. We have also checked that changing the
risk premium, the discount factor, or the number
of states covered by the safe technology, , does
not alter our results. In lines 22 and 23, we find
that higher participation in stock markets, which
can be interpreted as a higher dependence of the
economy on financial wealth, leads to larger
crashes, income drops, and current account
reversals.
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Overall, our baseline model matches the
stylized facts of Table 2 reasonably well. In
order to get a smaller current reversal, we would
need some degree of international tradability of
the safe technology (see line 7). There are differ-
ent plausible mechanisms to get a larger drop in
asset prices with similar drops in income and
current account reversals. First, a larger trade dis-
ruption (trade costs increasing from 40 percent to
60 percent in crash) would generate a 26.9-percent
crash in asset prices. Similarly, a high degree of
financial disruption (transaction costs increase
from 5 percent to 15 percent in crash) also gener-
ates a larger crash (23.7 percent). The model is
flexible enough to allow for domestic trade costs
on goods markets. If we assume that those trade
costs go from 0 to 20 percent in crisis time, this alone
would generate a crash of 25.8 percent. Domestic
trade and international trade disruptions reinforce
each other so that we can generate a sharp drop in
asset prices with relatively small levels of trade dis-
ruption in domestic and international markets.
The assumption that all assets give dividends
in only one state of nature (as opposed to sev-
eral) is immaterial for the results on relative
asset prices. But relaxing the assumption that
the risk of assets is identical in the two countries
and/or across the no-crash and crash equilibria
is interesting. If E assets are riskier (they give
dividends in fewer states of nature), then the
crash is less pronounced: the price of the asset
in normal times is lower so that the difference
between no-crash and crash is also lower.31 If,
however, during a crash assets become more
risky in the sense that the number of states they
cover is 10 percent lower than in the no-crash
equilibrium, then the drop in asset price is more
pronounced (28.6 percent). The introduction
of a fixed cost in the production of goods also
makes the crash more pronounced. If the fixed
cost is proportional to wage costs (at around 10
percent of the value of sales), this increases
profitability in the E market, and the magnitude
of the crash becomes larger at 26 percent.
V. Conclusion
Our model puts forward a demand-based
mechanism of crisis in emerging markets where
segmentation of the goods and asset markets
plays a key role. Our framework is the first one,
to our knowledge, that analyzes jointly home
market effects in the financial and goods mar-
kets and their interactions. Relatively high trade
costs on the goods market make profits and
dividends very dependent on domestic demand.
Financial globalization makes coordination on
capital flight possible. Emerging market income
itself depends on investment, which is affected
by asset prices, in turn dependent on domestic
income and demand. This circularity makes our
demand channel quantitatively powerful. Our
mechanism of financial crisis is very general,
since it is at work whenever there is a sizable
difference in income between countries and
there are trading costs in goods and financial
markets.
We see our approach as complementary to
existing views on the links between financial
globalization and crises. So far, the literature
has emphasized that financial globalization, by
making borrowing on world financial markets
easier, strengthens market failures prevalent in
emerging markets. In particular, moral hazard
and credit constraints have been shown to facil-
itate the advent of financial crises. Our paper
suggests that such market failures are not a
necessary condition for emerging markets to
become vulnerable to a crash when capital flows
are liberalized. Trade costs on international
trade in goods and assets will themselves gen-
erate that vulnerability.
Both the potential benefit of globalization
(in terms of cost of capital, investment, and
income) and the higher vulnerability of
emerging markets to a crash come from the
same factor that differentiates emerging mar-
kets and industrialized countries in our
model: their productivity and income level.
The higher vulnerability is not necessarily
due to bad institutions, bad incentives (bail-
outs), or bad exchange rate regimes. This is
not to say that these problems do not consti-
tute important channels through which finan-
cial globalization can make emerging markets
more vulnerable to a financial crisis.32 The
existing literature has logically recommended
31 For example, if the number of states covered by E assets
is 10 percent lower than in I, then the crash is 18.8 percent.
32 The inclusion of credit constraints on investment in our
model would certainly reinforce the possibility of a crash, as
the fall in asset prices would reduce the value of collateral.
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policies addressing the informational and insti-
tutional frictions at the origin of the credit
market imperfections it describes. More trans-
parency, better information, and better banking
regulation have been advocated. Similarly, cur-
rency mismatches in fixed exchange rate re-
gimes are listed as prime suspects to explain
crises of these countries. Our paper shows that
these policies and institutional changes may not
be sufficient to prevent crises in intermediate-
income countries and that financial crises may
be a more general phenomenon for those econ-
omies. A possible policy implication of our
model is that trade openness has a beneficial
role, since it mitigates the dependence of the
emerging market on domestic demand and de-
creases the domain of existence of multiple
equilibria. This also suggests that emerging
markets should liberalize their trade account
before their capital account. Although such a
prescription is sometimes heard in policy cir-
cles, we believe our paper is the first analytical
work giving an economic rationale to support it.
Ultimately, to analyze precisely policy implica-
tions on the timing of reforms, it would be
necessary to quantify a dynamic infinite horizon
version of the model. This would require, how-
ever, an equilibrium selection mechanism to
pick the crash or no-crash equilibrium. We
leave this for future work.
APPENDIX A: THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ON EMERGING MARKET ASSET PRICES
An increase in 
F affects only the qq curve. It will lead to an increase in q if the intersection point of the
qq curve and the YY curve shifts right when 
F increases. This will be the case if
sY

Fq  q

qq/d 1 	 q/d1  	 2
F 1 	 sY 
1  q21 	 
F2   	 1
F q2q/d  q/d
1 	 
T2
1 	 sY 1 	 
T 2
 0.
A sufficient condition for this is that q/d 	 1.
APPENDIX B: KEY EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL USED IN THE QUANTITATIVE SECTION
The model includes a safe asset which gives a dividend in a share  of the states of the world covered in
normal times, and has a return r. We also introduce a parameter  describing the extent of participation in the
stock market (only 1   households participate). The stock market equilibrium with limited participation in
normal times becomes
pE 

1    yE 	 wE(1 	 )zE  (1 	 )zI
F(q/d) 1  (yI 	 wI)
F(q/d)
1 
(1 	 )zI  (1 	 )zE
F(q/d)1  ;
pI 

1    yI 	 wI(1 	 )zI  (1 	 )zE
F(q/d)1   (yE 	 wE)
F(q/d)
 1
(1 	 )zE  (1 	 )zI
F(q/d) 1 .
Income in the emerging market in normal times is now given by yE  wE  (1  )pE2/2.
In crash, the stock market equilibrium becomes
pEc 

1    (1 	 )wE(1 	 )zE(rpEc /dEc ) 1  (1 	 )zIc
F(qc/dc) 1  (yIc 	 wI)
F(qc/dc)
1 
(1 	 )zIc  ;
pIc 

1    yIc 	 wI(1 	 )zIc  (1 	 )wE
F(qc/dc)
 1
(1 	 )zE(rpEc /dEc ) 1  (1 	 )zIc
F(qc/dc) 1 .
The dividends are given by equation (8) adjusted for limited participation and its symmetric in a crash. The
value of the emerging market demand of the safe asset in a crash is
wE
1  
rpEc  1
1 	 zErpEc  1  1 	 zIc
FpEc dIc /pIc  1
.
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